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The international law gaze: Lilly v Canada 
Dr Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez, University of Waikato, on national courts and foreign investment 
protection.  
 
New Zealand is party to several free trade agreements (FTAs), such as those with China, Malaysia, and  
Korea, that include investment chapters aimed at protecting foreign investors. These chapters also 
contemplate investor/State arbitration to settle disputes. It is, then, important to keep an eye on 
recent decisions regarding other FTAs, in order to identify how similar potential disputes involving the 
government or New Zealand investors abroad are likely be framed. A recent award by an international 
tribunal in Eli Lilly and Company v Government of Canada applying the North America Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) is one that deserves close evaluation. (International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, Eli Lilly and Company v Government of Canada. Case No. UNCT/142. 16 March 
2017. [Lilly v Canada]). 
 
Although the award has a strong intellectual property component, this article deals with a different 
dimension: how far can a foreign investor dissatisfied with a final court’s new interpretation of 
national law go in challenging this interpretation before an investor/State tribunal?  
 
Not that far. This is the general answer to this question offered by the Lilly tribunal. … but 
 
The Facts and Claims in Lilly v Canada 
Eli Lilly (Lilly) is a pharmaceutical company incorporated in the United States, which indirectly owns Eli 
Lilly Canada Inc, a Canadian subsidiary (Lilly Canada). Lilly obtained a Canadian patent for a compound 
called olanzapine in 1980 (the 687 patent). In 1991, Lilly also filed a patent application related to 
olanzapine, as a selection from the genus of the 687 patent, to be used in a product called Zyprexa to 
treat  schizophrenia. Lilly’s strategy was to seek to extend the protection to its invention after the first 
patents expired. The Zyprexa patent was issued by Canada in March 1998. (Lilly v Canada at [77]). In 
June 2007, a Canadian company, Novopharm, sought approval to market a generic version of Zyprexa. 
Canada granted the approval, and Lilly filed suit against Novopharm for patent infringement. (Lilly v 
Canada at [79] – [80]). The result of this process was a decision by the Federal Court that the Zyprexa 
patent was invalid for lack of utility. (Lilly v Canada at [82]). 
 
The second relevant decision is related to a compound called atomoxetine, which is used as an anti-
depressant. Canada granted Lilly a patent for this compound in 1979. (Lilly v Canada at [85]). 
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Subsequently, and following a similar business strategy, Lilly filed a new use patent application, 
because the compound could also be used to treat attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder. (Lilly v 
Canada at [87]). In October 2002, Canada granted the new patent, and the medication was marketed 
under the name Strattera. (Lilly v Canada at [91]). Novapharm challenged the validity of this patent, 
and the Federal Court found that the Strattera patent was “invalid on the basis of inutility.” (Lilly v 
Canada at [93]). 
 
Lilly regarded the judicial decisions as violations of Canada’s obligations under NAFTA. The two claims 
were, first, violations of the obligation not to expropriate investments without compensation under 
NAFTA Article 1110 (Lilly v Canada at [181]). This provision sets forth: “1. No Party may directly or 
indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or 
take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment 
("expropriation"), except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory basis; (c) in accordance 
with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and (d) on payment of compensation …” 
 
The second claim raised by Lilly was Canada’s contravention of the obligation to grant investors fair 
and equitable treatment (FET) under NAFTA Article 1105. (Lilly v Canada at [183]). This precept 
establishes that “each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in 
accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and 
security.” 
 
Dramatic Change in the Utility Requirement under Canadian Law 
The basis of the claims was that, according to Lilly, Canadian courts had dramatically changed their 
interpretation of the utility test at the time the Zyprexa and Strattera patents had been granted and 
before the patents were invalidated. (Lilly v Canada at [234]). Then, the traditional utility test was 
much easier to meet. According to Lilly, “A slight amount of utility satisfied the low threshold of utility 
required. … so long as an invention was capable of being put to a specific use, even if that use had not 
commercial value, then it was ‘useful’ under the Patent Act.” (Lilly v Canada at [228]).  
 
Lilly argued that a new test, “promise utility doctrine,” which required a higher requirement of utility, 
had been added to the traditional utility test. (Lilly v Canada at [235]). The higher requirement was 
evidenced by three new developments by Canadian courts, according to Lilly: (i) the promise standard; 
(ii) post-filling evidence; and (iii) disclosure of sound prediction. 
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Before proceeding, a brief description of the policy underlying patent law is in order. (E. Richard Gold 
and Michael Shortt, “The Promise of the Patent in Canada and Around the World”, 30 Canadian 
Intellectual Property Review (2014)). As the Canadian Supreme Court stated, “The patent system is 
based on a ‘bargain’, or quid pro quo: the inventor is granted exclusive rights in a new and useful 
invention for a limited period in exchange for disclosure of the invention so that society can benefit 
from this knowledge.” (Teva Canada v Pfizer Canada, 2012 SCC 60, [2012] 3 SCR 625. at [32]). The 
patent application contains the inventor’s promises that the invention is useful for certain purposes. 
The existence of the promises is also the basis of the granting of the patent. Or, as the House of Lords 
stated, “[patent] protection is purchased by the promise of results. It does not, and ought not to, 
survive the proved failure of the promise to produce the results.” (Hatmaker v Joseph Nathan & Co 
(1919), 36 RPC 231 (HL) at [237] Lord Birkenhead). The inventor must then be careful in its application 
to not overstate the promises of utility, because if any of them is proved not to exist, the whole patent 
can be invalidated. 
 
Lilly then argued, as the first element, that as a result of the case law since 2005, the Canadian courts 
had identified or inferred additional promises of utility from the disclosure (in the patent application) 
that went beyond the utility of the claimed invention, imposing an elevated requirement of utility. 
(Lilly v Canada at [236]). This first element was labelled the “promise standard.” 
 
The second element of the alleged new doctrine was related to the evidence required to prove 
promises of utility, and it was labelled “post-filling evidence.” According to the claimant, the Supreme 
Court of Canada changed its interpretation of patent law in this area in 2002 in AZT: post-filling 
evidence would not be admissible to prove promises of utility. So, for instance, evidence of scientific 
effectiveness and commercial success obtained after the patent application was filed could not be 
used to prove utility at the time of the application. (Lilly v Canada at [241]).   
 
The third element of the new doctrine was also related to evidence and was referred to in the award 
as “disclosure of sound prediction.” According to Lilly, Canadian courts determined, since the 2008 
Raloxifene decision, that pre-filing evidence not included in the patent application could not be 
admissible to prove predicted utility in the event of subsequent litigation. (Lilly v Canada at [245]).  
“Patent Office examiners were instructed to require the factual basis and line of reasoning for sound 
prediction to be in the patent itself.” (Lilly v Canada at [248]).  
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Based on this analysis, Lilly claimed that it had ““legitimate expectations that its Zyprexa and Strattera 
patents would not be invalidated on the basis of a radically new utility requirement.” (Lilly v Canada 
at [261]).  Lilly also argued that the utility requirement “was outside the ‘acceptable margin of change’ 
that investors must anticipate.” (Lilly v Canada at [269]).   
 
The Utility Requirement Is Arbitrary and Discriminatory 
 
Lilly also argued that the utility requirement was arbitrary and discriminatory. It claimed that the 
process of construing the promise of a patent was inherently arbitrary, differed from one court to the 
other, and led to conflicting decisions regarding the same patent. Lilly submitted evidence of the 
patent for Latanoprost: two Federal Court of Appeal panels reached opposite conclusions as to its 
validity. It was not an isolated event, according to Lilly. (Lilly v Canada at [391]). 
   
Turning to the concept of sound prediction and the ban on post-filing evidence, Lilly argued that it was 
equally arbitrary. (i) Patent applicants did not know “how much, and what type of evidence a judge 
will require to demonstrate or sound predict a patent’s utility.” (Lilly v Canada at [392]).  Finally, Lilly 
claimed that the promise utility doctrine was not based on any legitimate policy purpose, because the 
doctrines created the conditions for inconsistent results. (Lilly v Canada at [395]).   
 
Finally, Lilly also claimed that the utility promise doctrine discriminated against pharmaceutical 
patents, contrary to NAFTA Article 1709(7). Since 2005, said Lilly, only pharmaceutical patents had 
been invalidated by courts for lack of utility. (Lilly v Canada at [398]). Finally, Lilly also based its 
discrimination claim on the fact that the main beneficiary of the doctrine had been the Canadian 
generic drug industry. (Lilly v Canada at [401]).   
 
Canada’s Reply 
Canada denied that there had been a dramatic change in interpretation of the utility requirement and 
began by arguing that the term “useful” was not defined in its Patent Act and, therefore, that its 
meaning would evolve through case law. (Lilly v Canada at [270]).  
 
Then Canada addressed the three elements of the alleged dramatic change in the requirement. First, 
Canada posited that the promise standard was not novel in Canadian law and case law. “Utility has 
long been a bifurcated standard”. (Lilly v Canada at [271]). First, if the patent document made no 
promise of utility, the threshold was low, and a minimum useful result was enough. Second, if the 
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inventor made a promise of utility, the promise had to be fulfilled. The fact that there was a minimal 
useful result was not enough. (Lilly v Canada at [271 and footnote 350]).   
 
As to post-filing evidence, Canada disagreed with the view that the Supreme Court’s decision in ATZ 
constituted a dramatic change, and it submitted evidence of a comment by a prominent Canadian 
intellectual property law firm describing the decision as reaffirming a long-standing position on the 
topic and confirming the disallowance of this kind of evidence. (Lilly v Canada at [283]).   
 
As to the disclosure of sound prediction, Canada argued that it had been recognized in its law since 
the 1979 Supreme Court Monsanto decision and that the Canadian Patent Office’s practice during the 
1990s illustrated that the Raloxifene decision did not establish the requirement. (Lilly v Canada at [286] 
– [287]).   
 
Canada then argued that Lilly could not have legitimate expectations that its patents could not be 
invalidated by courts for lack of utility. (Lilly v Canada at [302]). Canada concluded that, even if a 
dramatic change had taken place, “it is trite to say that the common law evolves over time. Any 
sophisticated investor expects developments in the law, particularly in the area of patent law. It simply 
cannot be that every time a court overrules a precedent, it violated customary international law [and 
NAFTA FET].” (Lilly v Canada at [306]).   
 
Arbitrary and Discriminatory Character of the Utility Doctrine: Canada’s Response  
Canada responded that identifying the promises in a patent was not inherently unpredictable. Patents 
are constructed as a whole, and according to well-established principles of construction. (Lilly v 
Canada at [403]).  The existence of different results is owed “to the highly fact-dependent 
circumstance of each case.” (Lilly v Canada at [404]).   
 
Canada also asserted that the ban on post-filing evidence was necessary to preclude the granting of 
patents based on speculation, even if such speculation became reality later on. (Lilly v Canada at [406]). 
Also the ban “is ‘rationally connected’ to the goal of preventing patenting too far upstream.” (Lilly v 
Canada at [406]).    
 
As to the discriminatory nature of the utility doctrine, Canada stated that the understanding of the 
application of its patent law could not be limited to the results of litigation. A wider perspective 
showed a different picture: almost 26000 pharmaceutical patents had been granted between 1989 
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and 2013. (Lilly v Canada at [413]).  Canada finally noted that 50% of the top generic drug makers were 
not own by Canadians and that the rules applied to Canadian companies as well. (Lilly v Canada at 
[415]).   
 
Underlying Lilly’s claims was the critical issue of whether a State could be internationally responsible 
for judicial decisions that did not constitute a denial of justice. Lilly sought to escape the high bar of a 
claim of violation of an international investment agreement (IIA) as a result of a denial of justice. A 
recent decision clearly illustrates this high bar: “For a denial of justice to exist under international law 
there must be ‘clear evidence of … an outrageous failure of the judicial system’ or a demonstration of 
‘systemic injustice’ or that ‘the impugned decision was clearly improper and discreditable.’” (Award, 
Philip Morris Brands Sarl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v Oriental Republic of 
Uruguay (ICSID Case No ARB/10/7, July 8, 2016. at [500]). 
 
 If a host State could be internationally liable for judicial acts beyond the event of denial of justice, 
investors could recover losses resulting from judicial decisions in which due process had been properly 
followed. This was Lilly’s position. If this were not the case, according to Lilly, the result “would be to 
exempt all judge-made law from the requirements of international law.” (Lilly v Canada at [177]). On 
the contrary, Canada was of the view that the acceptance of Lilly’s claim would have had the following 
effect: “NAFTA Chapter Eleven tribunals will be transformed both into tribunals with plenary 
jurisdiction over all international treaties and supranational courts of appeal in domestic property law 
issues.” (Lilly v Canada at [190]). The stakes were, then, high for both investors and States’ judicial 
systems. 
 
The Tribunal’s Decision 
 
Not Just Denial of Justice Claims 
 
The tribunal took a middle ground based on a distinction regarding the type of claim of violation raised 
by the investor.  
 
First, and regarding the claim that judicial decisions could be contrary to the fair and equitable 
treatment under NAFTA Article 1105(1), the tribunal endorsed some elements of Lilly’s position and 
expressed that “there are distinctions to be made between conduct that may amount to a denial (or 
gross denial) of justice and other conduct that may also be sufficiently egregious and shocking, such 
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as manifest arbitrariness or blatant unfairness. … It follows … that a claimed breach of the customary 
international minimum standard of treatment requirement of NAFTA Article 1105(1) may be properly 
a basis for a claim under NAFTA  Article 1105 notwithstanding that is not cast in denial of justice terms.” 
(Lilly v Canada at [223]).  However, and in a key nod to Canada, the tribunal also pointed out that 
NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals, those dealing with investor/States disputes, should pay considerable 
deference to domestic courts’ decisions. (Lilly v Canada at [224]).  In sum, the possibility exists, but 
given the high degree of deference, the chances of success of this claim are, in principle, low. 
 
 
Second, the tribunal stated that an investor/State tribunal could deem a domestic court’s decision a 
violation of the obligation not to expropriate when the judicial act or omission crystallized the taking 
of the investment. (Lilly v Canada at [221]). This conclusion could be reached even if a denial of justice, 
as defined above, did not exist, because the given national court followed its normal process. 
Investor/State tribunals would not owe any deference to the court’s decision. This approach favours 
investors. 
 
Having made the afore-mentioned determinations, the tribunal proceeded to address the specific 
claims regarding the violations of NAFTA obligations by Canada as a result of the alleged change in the 
interpretation of its patent legislations. 
 
No Dramatic Change in the Interpretation of Canadian Patent Law 
The Utility Requirement 
The tribunal rejected Lilly’s claim that there had been a change in the utility requirement under 
Canadian Patent law after 2005 in the sense that in addition to the “mere-scintilla” test, there was the 
promise standard. The double standard, the tribunal found, had been recognized by Canadian courts 
since the 1981 Supreme Court judgment in Consolboard, and courts had subsequently cited it as an 
authority regarding the co-existence of the two tests. (Lilly v Canada at [316] – [318]).  
 
The tribunal pointed out that, although the promise standard had existed since the 1980s, it had not 
played a significant role until 2005. However, for the tribunal this lack of significance was irrelevant 
since “the rule was clearly ‘out there’, to be ignored at the patentees’s peril.” (Lilly v Canada at [324]). 
 
Post-Filing Evidence 
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The tribunal also concluded that the Supreme Court’s decision in AZT had not introduced a dramatic 
change regarding the inadmissibility of post-filing evidence. (Lilly v Canada at [337]). The tribunal 
looked at the record and found that, when reversing a decision by the Federal Court of Appeal, Ciba-
Geigy, the Supreme Court had not changed law and that the AZT judgment was based on the Patent 
Law, the case law, and policy considerations. (Lilly v Canada at [331]). The tribunal also noted that 
experts had conflicting views on whether AZT had introduced a change to the law. On these bases, the 
tribunal arrived at the above-mentioned conclusion. 
 
Disclosure for Sound Prediction 
The tribunal found that the investor had raised the new requirement argument before the Canadian 
Court of Appeal in the Raloxifene case, in which one of its patents was at issue, and that the Court of 
Appeal had rejected it in 2008 based on prior case law by the Supreme Court. (Lilly v Canada at [340]). 
The tribunal also stated that disclosure of sound prediction had also been invoked by the Canadian 
Office Action in communications addressed to Lilly in 2003 and 2004, so the latter had been aware 
before Raloxifene. (Lilly v Canada at [345] – [346]). After examining all the evidence, the tribunal 
concluded that there was a “progressive development of the doctrine of sound prediction over 
decades … This process had of course involved some elements of change, but based on the record, 
that change is more incremental and evolutionary than dramatic.” (Lilly v Canada at [349] – [350]). 
 
Lilly’s Alleged Legitimate Expectations 
The tribunal also dismissed the allegation of violation of Lilly’s legitimate expectations. Siding with 
Canada, the tribunal stated that all patentees faced the risk of invalidation as a result of challenges 
before courts based on the invention’s lack of satisfaction of patentability requirements. (Lilly v 
Canada at [382]. No investor could then have the expectation that such an invalidation could not occur.  
 
But in addition, the tribunal pointed out that Lilly’s expectation that the utility of Strattera and Zyprexa 
had a low threshold to meet and could not be invalidated due to lack of utility could not be deemed a 
legitimate expectation. The reason was that the promise doctrine had basis in the Canadian law in 
existence at the time the patents were filed and that Lilly “should have, and could have, anticipated 
that the law would change over time as a function of judicial decision-making.” (Lilly v Canada at [384]). 
 
Arbitrariness 
The tribunal rejected the claim of arbitrariness of the promise utility doctrine based on the alleged 
unpredictability of results unpersuasive. To the tribunal, some degree of unpredictability was 
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expected regarding the application of any law, and inconsistencies in interpretation could also occur 
as a result of the adversarial process dealing with different facts. (Lilly v Canada at [421]).  
 
The tribunal also found that there was no lack of predictability regarding the ban of post-filing 
evidence. “To the contrary”, it said, “it is a bright line rule that sets a clear date by which patentees 
must prove utility.” (Lilly v Canada at [425]). The tribunal also noted that Lilly had not been able to 
prove that patentees were unable to know how much evidence was required by Canadian courts to 
prove the utility requirement. There was no evidence that the courts had systematically applied a 
variety of evidentiary rules in similar cases or that evidence had been required based on personal 
preferences. (Lilly v Canada at [424 footnote 585]). Finally, although the tribunal acknowledged the 
difficulties that companies faced in timing investment and patentability requirements, such difficulties 
were the result of a policy decision by Canada. It was not the tribunal’s role to question Canada’s 
policy choices. (Lilly v Canada at [426]). 
 
The tribunal also looked at the apparent arbitrariness of the sound prediction doctrine because of lack 
of policy justification and rejected the claim. According to the tribunal, it was not irrational that, in 
exchange for the monopoly granted by the patent, patentees had to make their predictions of utility 
public. (Lilly v Canada at [428]). 
 
Discrimination 
The tribunal also rejected the discrimination claim and concluded that Lilly had not proven that the 
promise utility doctrine discriminated against pharmaceutical patents as a technological domain. 
Indeed, there had been no evidence supporting the causal link between the doctrine and the high 
percentage of inutility decisions in this industry. Other reasons could well explain such higher 
percentage. (Lilly v Canada at [435]). As to the discrimination based on nationality, the tribunal 
responded that the evidence was insufficient to prove such claim. (Lilly v Canada at [441]). 
 
Lessons to Learn from Lilly v Canada 
This NAFTA case dealt more broadly with the scope of scrutiny under applicable international 
investment agreements by investor/State tribunals of courts’ interpretations of domestic law. There 
is no question that this is a systemic issue for international investment law in general, even if the 
wording of the FET obligation in IIAs might differ, and that future investor/States tribunals will look to 
Lilly v Canada for guidance.  
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The Lilly tribunal had to walk a fine line between not being too intrusive in the domain of domestic 
adjudication and recognizing the reality that courts in all countries were not fully independent and 
could also be under the influence of governments. Too much intrusion disturbs host States, those that 
are party to IIAs, and ignoring the institutional reality of some judicial systems leaves foreign investors 
lacking the protection that IIAs aim at ensuring.   
 
The balance was achieved first by establishing that courts’ decisions could be challenged even if due 
process has been followed and no denial of justice could be claimed. The tribunal was, though, 
cautious in the scope of the opportunity for review of judicial decisions. Mainly, courts’ role in alleged 
expropriatory measures enacted by a government could be the subject of more scrutiny by 
investor/State tribunals. The tribunal was right, in the present author’s view, in leaving this possibility 
open in general. This is a finding that clearly protects foreign investors at a time when they feel the 
urgency to get the operation of the protection granted by IIAs. 
 
The tribunal was clear, though, that the situation was different if the investor was challenging stand-
alone judicial decisions on the basis of a violation of the FET standard. Investors might expect that the 
odds of this claim were against them because investor/State tribunals would be deferential to 
domestic courts’ judgments.  New Zealand courts adjudicating disputes involving complainants who 
are nationals of States that have FTAs with investment chapters with New Zealand can be confident 
that investor/State tribunals will not lightly transform into appeal courts in the event of claims of this 
particular nature, as the tribunal in Lilly v Canada explicitly stated. 
 
From the investor’s perspective, it has the burden of proving (i) that there is a change in the 
interpretation, and (ii) that the change is dramatic. The existence of any change will be assessed in 
light of what other courts have expressed regarding the alleged existence of the change, and future 
investor/States tribunals finding Lilly v Canada persuasive will pay significant deference to such 
expressions. In effect, Lilly questioned how the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in Consolboard 
should be understood. Lilly’s view differed from the position that other Canadian courts had taken on 
this case. The tribunal replied, “The Tribunal sees no basis for questioning the Canadian judiciary’s 
interpretation of its own Supreme Court precedent.” (Lilly v Canada at [321]).  
 
It is also important to note that the Lilly tribunal assessed the dramatic nature of the change and when 
it took place in terms of how it emerged and not in terms of the extent of the change. This approach 
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favours host States: so long as the change arises incrementally, as in Lilly v Canada, the change might 
not be regarded as dramatic, even if it is significant.  
 
Not less important for host States are the tribunal’s findings that the unpredictability or inconsistency 
of outcomes resulting from the application of a judicial interpretation will not be deemed arbitrary 
and a violation of a FET obligation in IIAs. The tribunal was right that, even if such situations were 
undesirable, the threshold of violation of such obligation was usually high. Foreign investors should 
take note of these findings and properly assess their likelihood of success before making a claim 
against a domestic court’s interpretation as a result of its alleged unpredictability and inconsistent 
results. 
 
Open Questions after Lilly v Canada 
There were, however, some issues left open in Lilly v Canada. As has been shown, the tribunal’s 
conclusion was that the change in Canadian patent law had not been dramatic. The question is, then, 
whether a change in interpretation by domestic courts that is dramatic can constitute a violation of 
the FET for this reason alone.  U-turns in case law do not happen often but they take place. 
 
Dramatic changes of interpretation of pre-existent legislation not by courts but by public organs have 
been the subject of investment arbitration in the past under NAFTA and other international 
investment treaties. Assessed in isolation, they seem to have a mixed result. However, evaluated on 
the basis of their particular facts and law, a different picture emerges.  
 
In Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. the Republic of Ecuador, an investor/State 
tribunal applying the Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment dealt with what could be 
called a dramatic change in interpretation. Ecuadorian tax authorities had interpreted tax legislation 
in a way that granted Occidental a tax rebate. However, subsequently, the authorities altered the 
interpretation of the relevant legislation to conclude that, given the nature of its activities, Occidental 
did not meet the requirements to be granted the tax rebate. In addition, the authorities requested 
reimbursement of those accorded in the past. (Final Award in the Matter of an UNCITRAL 
ARBITRATION. London Court of International Arbitration. Administered Case No UN 3463. Occidental 
Exploration and Production Company v. the Republic of Ecuador. July 1st, 2004, at [134] – [135]. 
[Occidental v Ecuador]).  
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The tribunal in this case concluded that the change in interpretation constituted a violation of the FET 
provided for in the treaty. (Occidental v Ecuador at [187]). The basis for the conclusion was found in 
the preamble of the agreement. The tribunal stated that “although fair and equitable treatment is not 
defined in the Treaty, the Preamble clearly records the agreement of the parties that such treatment 
‘is desirable in order to maintain a stable framework for investment and maximum effective utilization 
of economic resources’. The stability of the legal and business framework is thus an essential element 
of fair and equitable treatment.” (Occidental v Ecuador at [184]). This was a decision in the early years 
of investment arbitration, and such generous interpretations of preambular language are rare today.  
 
Nonetheless, and although such language is absent in the investment chapters of New Zealand’s FTAs 
with China and Malaysia, it is worth noting that Article 10.1 of the New Zealand – Korea FTA  includes, 
as an objective of the investment chapter, to encourage investment, the following phrase: “within a 
stable framework of rules …” Despite this text, it is unlikely, in principle, that a dramatic change in 
interpretation of a legislation by a New Zealand governmental body adversely affecting a Korean 
investor could be deemed contrary to the treaty’s FTA. In effect, it can be said that the award in Glamis 
Gold v United States of America reflects much more how investor/States tribunals are dealing with 
dramatic changes of interpretation by public organs today. (Glamis Gold v United States of America, 
Award of 8 June 2009 [Glamis v US]).  The reasoning equally applies to dramatic changes by courts. 
 
Glamis v US was a NAFTA dispute between a Canadian investor and the United States as a result of a 
change in the interpretation of legislation by American federal and state authorities. The dispute arose 
out of the denial of approval of a mining project to protect the significant cultural value that Native 
Americans attached to the land in which the project would take place. The land was important because 
it had spirit circles, sight lines, and teaching areas (Glamis v US at [805]), and equally significantly, the 
land contained what the Quechan tribe called a Trail of Dreams, a place where they celebrated the 
creation of the world. (Glamis v US at [105]).  The Glamis tribunal acknowledged that a key concept of 
the legislation, the “unnecessary and undue degradation” standard, was applied for decades in the 
sense that the discovery of aboriginal artifacts  at a mining site would require mitigation measures, 
but not the denial of the project. (Glamis v US at [758]). The reason for the change was that, for the 
first time, a mining project had confronted “a significant unavoidable adverse impact to cultural 
resources and Native American sacred sites.” (Glamis v US at [760]). The tribunal deemed the change 
in interpretation dramatic. (Glamis v US at [761]). But despite this, the tribunal concluded that the 
change was not contrary to the NAFTA FET, as claimed by Glamis. (Glamis v US at [762]). The reasons 
were several: (i) the interpretation was not arbitrary but based on pre-existing statutory and 
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regulatory provisions; (ii) the interpretation did not have a manifest lack of reasons, since it consisted 
of several pages of legal and factual analyses; (iii) the decision did not create a blatant unfairness 
against the claimant because the decision was of general applicability; and (iv) claimant had not 
reasonable expectations induced by the United States that its project would be approved. (Glamis v 
US at [763] - [767]). 
 
Following Glamis v US, it can be said that a dramatic change introduced by a court per se should not 
be deemed a violation of the FET. First, there is nothing unfair or unequitable when a court interprets 
the law in a novel way in response to a factual situation that previous courts have not dealt with, for 
instance. But even if the facts are not unique, a novel judicial interpretation still should not be deemed 
contrary to the FET , if the host State has not specifically created in the claimant investor the 
expectation that the existing legislation will not change as a result of either new regulations or new 
interpretations.  
 
Basically, if, as Glamis v US illustrated, governmental organs are owed deference regarding the policy 
choices reflected in the novel interpretations, which respond to a political decision-making process, 
the deference is even more expected regarding courts, which lack such political motivation, in 
principle, and act on the basis of their impartial understanding of the law. In sum, courts’ dramatic 
changes of interpretation should not constitute violations of the FET on their own. 
 
In a Nutshell 
A general portrait of the impact that Lilly v Canada may have on a potential investment dispute 
involving New Zealand courts as a result of an investor/State tribunal assessing claims by foreign 
investors could have some of the following elements. 
(i) Denial of Justice claims against New Zealand judicial decisions as violations of FET obligations: 
possible but very low probability of success. (ii) Investors’ claims as a result of judicial decisions 
crystallizing an expropriation: possible. (iii) Changes of interpretation by New Zealand courts as 
violations of the FET: possible but low probability of success if the change takes place incrementally. 
(iv) Dramatic changes of interpretation as contrary to a FET obligation: possible but low probability of 
success in light of the potential extension of the analysis carried out in Glamis v US. 
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